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Modern Constitutional Democracy
and Imperialism
JAMES TULLY*
To what extent is the development of modern constitutional democracy as a state form in
the West and its spread around the world implicated in western imperialism? This has been
a leading question of legal scholarship over the last thirty years. James Tully draws on this
scholarship to present a preliminary answer. Part I sets out seven central features of
modern constitutional democracy and its corresponding international institutions of law
and government. Part II sets out three major imperial roles that these legal and political
institutions have played, and continue to play. And finally, Part III surveys ways in which the
persisting imperial dimensions can be de-imperialized by being brought under the shared
democratic authority of the people and peoples who are subject to them.
Dans quelle mesure peut-on dire que le d6veloppement de [a d~mocratie constitutionnelle
moderne en tant que forme 6tatique dans l'Occident et sa diffusion aux quatre coins du
monde sont impliqu~s dans l'imp6rialisme occidental ? Ces trente derni6res annees, ceci a
6t6 une question pr~pond~rante du savoir juridique. James Tully puise dans ce savoir pour
pr6senter une r~ponse pr6liminaire. La Partie I expose sept attributs fondamentaux de [a
d6mocratie constitutionnelle moderne et ses institutions internationales correspondantes
du droit et du gouvernement. La Partie II d~crit trois grands rSles imp~riaux que ces
institutions juridiques et politiques ont exerc6 et continuent 6 exercer. Enfin, [a Partie III se
penche sur les mani6res dont les dimensions imp6riales persistantes peuvent 6tre
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< d6simp~rialis~es >> par Le fait d'6tre mises sous l'autorit6 d~mocratique partag~e de La
popuLation et des peupLes qui y sont soumis.
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THIS ARTICLE IS A STUDY of the historical and contemporary relationships
between modern constitutional representative democracy and western
imperialism. It starts from a remarkable article in The Economic History Review
in 1953 by two Cambridge historians of imperialism, Ronald Robinson and
John Gallagher, entitled "The Imperialism of Free Trade."' The authors
showed that the foreign policy of free trade by the imperial powers in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not anti-imperial but, rather, an
alternative form of imperialism to colonial imperialism that gradually won out
in the late twentieth century. The "great powers," with Great Britain in the
lead, realized that they could induce and govern, by various informal means,
the formation of legal and political regimes in non-European countries which
would function to open their resources, labour, and markets to free trade
dominated by economic competition among European powers, without the
need for the expensive and increasingly unpopular old imperial system of
formal colonies and monopoly trading companies. In a series of publications in
the following decades Robinson, the German imperial historians Wolfgang J.
Mommsen and Jiirgen Osterhammel, and their many followers went on to
document the long and complex history of free trade imperialism since the
eighteenth century and to argue that decolonization and the Cold War
comprised its triumph over colonial imperialism.
Decolonization and the Cold War, they argued, involved the dismantling
of the remaining formal colonies, mandates, and trusteeships, and the transfer
of limited powers of self-rule to the westernized elites of nominally sovereign,
yet still dependent, local governments in a global network of free trade
1. John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" (1953) 6 Econ.
History Rev. 1.
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imperialism. During and after decolonization, a new, non-colonial ensemble of
global institutions came together to govern the persisting imperial network of
relationships of dependency, inequality, and economic exploitation. It includes
the post-World War II great powers (the "Great Eight" (G8), with the United
States taking the military and economic lead from Great Britain); their
transnational corporations; the Bretton Woods institutions of global governance
and their successors (The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World
Trade Organization after 1995 (WTO) and its evolving transnational trade
agreements such as TRIPS and GATS); supportive non-governmental and civil
society organizations; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and
the global military dominance of the United States. They called this complex
transition period "the imperialism of decolonization" and "the end of empire
and the continuity of imperialism." Since the defeat of the Soviet Union and its
third-world allies at the end of the Cold War in 1989, this complex form of
governance has been extended over the planet.2
This hypothesis of the contemporary world order of global governance as
the continuity of western imperialism by informal means is now widely used by
scholars. 3 It is variously termed "open door" and "free trade" imperialism,
neo-colonialism, imperialism without colonies, "postcolonial" imperialism, and
the "new" imperialism. However, for two defining reasons it is now usually
2. Ibid.; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "The End of Empire and the Continuity of Imperialism" in
Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Jurgen Osterhammel, eds., Imperialism andAfier: Continuities and
Discontinuities (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). The importance of the "informal
imperialism theory" advanced by Gallagher & Robinson is discussed by Mommsen, who
argues that it is the most important theory of imperialism in the modern period. See
Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories ofImperialism, trans. by P.S. Falla (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1977) [Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism]. I discuss this theory of
contemporary imperialism and several others that were developed in the same period in
James Tully, "On Law, Democracy and Imperialism" in Emilios Christodoulidis & Stephen
Tierney, eds., Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2008) [Tully, "On Law, Democracy and Imperialism"]. "
3. See e.g. Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism]; David Harvey, The
New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Stephen Howe, Empire: A Very
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) [Howe, Empire]; Daniel H.
Hexon & Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" (2007) 101
Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 253; and Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, ibid.
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called "informal and interactive" imperialism. First, it is a complex form of rule
that governs imperialized peoples by means other than formal colonies (that is,
by a combination of informal and indirect means). Second, the hegemonic
great powers and their accompanying institutions recognize the imperialized or
subalternized peoples as self-governing constitutional states and they interact
with them on this basis, yet within the deeply unequal hegemon-subaltern
relations of economic, political, legal, educational, and military power laid
down over centuries of western expansion (that is, an interactive mode of
governance among unequal sovereigns rather than the unilateral domination
of formal colonialism).'
Gallagher, Robinson, and Mommsen stressed the importance of imperially
imposed legal and political institutions in dispossessing non-European peoples
of popular sovereignty over their resources, labour, and markets and opening
them to the informal paramountcy of the great powers and their trading
companies. However, they did not treat this aspect in detail, concentrating
instead on economic, administrative, military, and educational means of
informal dependency and rule. The objective of this article is to describe the
imperial roles that the spread of modern constitutional forms and constituent
powers have played in this interpretation of global governance. Part I sets out
seven main features or aspects of the modern, western module of constituent
powers and constitutional forms that is commonly called constitutional
democracy and democratization today. Part II goes on to show the many ways
that legal and political prototypes of constitutional democracy have been
extended around the world by formal and informal imperial means to subalternize
non-European peoples. The third and final Part examines democratic efforts to
de-imperialize the imperial dimensions of modern constitutional democracy,
that is, to bring them under the shared democratic authority of the peoples who
are subject to them. I call these de-imperializing attempts "democratic
constitutionalism" (in contrast to "constitutional democracy").'
4. See Tarak Barkawi & Mark Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International
Relations" (2002) 31 Millennium 109; Howe, Empire, ibid; and Gerry J. Simpson, Great
Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States].
5. I have discussed democratic constitutionalism as an alternative to the imperialism of modern
constitutional democracy in James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of
diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) [Tully, Strange Multiplicity]; James
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I. WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: SEVEN FEATURES OF
THE MODERN ARRANGEMENT OF CONSTITUENT POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS
In their perspicuous introduction to the European University Institute seminar,
Loughlin and Walker describe the central tension of the modern arrangement
of constituent powers and constitutional forms as follows:
The paradox [of constituent power and constitutional form] is the expression of the
fact that modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two fundamental though
antagonistic imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated from the
"consent of the people," and that, to be sustained and effective, governmental power
must be divided, constrained and exercised through distinctive institutional forms.
Although each of the imperatives is expressed in early-modern formulations of
legitimate governmental power, it is only with the emergence of the modern sense of
a constitution that this tension between constituent power (the power of "the
people" to make-and break--the constituted authority of the state) and
constitutional form (the formal framework of rule erected as a bargain or contract, or
evolved in their absence) becomes more acute.
6
I start from their description and analysis to set out seven salient features
of this paradoxical modern configuration of constituent powers and
constitutional forms. I follow common usage in calling this conjunction of
modern western-style constitutions and representative governments
constitutional democracy (without scare quotes) yet bearing in mind that this
elegant phrase hides its historical particularity and makes it appear universal
(which is precisely its rhetorical function). I call it constitutional democracy in
the narrow sense when I contrast it with constitutional democracy in the broad
sense, which includes non-western customary legal and political orders of
constitutional forms and constituent powers.
Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns in relation to their ideals of Constitutionalism and
Democracy" (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 204 [Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns"].
6. Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, "Introduction" (Presented at the Seminar on Constituent
Power and Constitutional Form, Florence, 24-25 March 2006) reproduced in Martin
Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds., The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and
Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 1-2.
7. That is, "constitutional democracy" appears to refer to any legal and political order that has
some kind of constitution and democracy, and so appears to include pluralism
(constitutional democracy in the broad sense). Yet, this term is standardly used to refer
exclusively to (1) a particular type of modern constitutional representative government in the
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First, I take a modern "constitutional form" to be a structure of law that
has a degree of separation or disembeddedness from the activities of those who
are subject to it and has the compliance capacity to structure or even constitute
the field of recognition and interaction of the people subject to it. If it did not
have this degree of autonomy or formality there would not be the "paradoxical"
relationship between the rule of law and constituent powers at its centre. Like
most historians of western constitutionalism, Loughlin and Walker see this
disembeddedness to be distinctive of the modern phase of constitutionalism,
perhaps no earlier than the building of absolute and constitutionally limited.
centralized states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In my opinion,
historians and anthropologists are correct to say that many non-western
civilizations do not have indigenous constitutional forms of this specifically
modern disembedded kind. This difference is usually indicated -by calling
western legal orders mostly formal and non-western mostly customary, and
ranking modern western law as superior and more "advanced" for this reason
(among others). This is not to say that non-modern legal orders do not have a
constitution, since any persisting legal order is a constitution in the Aristotelian
or ancient sense, whether customary or formal. But in the influential debates
over the American and French constitutions (and the constitutional debates
that have followed down to today in Afghanistan and Iraq), an embedded
(customary) constitution was defined as ancient in contrast to a modern
(formal) constitution, and thus said not to be a constitution at all. This elision
was then applied to virtually all non-European legal orders by the nineteenth-
century authors of modern international law.8
Let us call this first aspect of modern constitutionalism the formality or
autonomy condition. That is, there are laws that are not immanent norms
within the activities they regulate and which change as subjects interact with
them in day-to-day rule following (as with customary laws), but are external to
the activities. They thus constitute or legislate the field of practice, and subjects
West, and (2) particular legal and political orders in the non-West that are similar in some
respects and thus are said to be on the historical path to "developed" constitutional
democracy in the western sense (constitutional democracy in the narrow sense). This slippage
is intrinsic to the standard usage of the term "constitutional democracy." The seeming
* inclusiveness of the broad sense comes to be predicated only on instances of the narrow sense
in the course of its use.
8. See Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 5 and Part II below.
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comply. If people wish to change the laws they must go to a separate
institutionalized procedure such as a court, a legislature, a formal amending
procedure, or judicial review. Kant's imposition theory of law is the classic
modern theory of law in this formal sense, yet it goes back to Samuel
Pufendorf's theory of modern law in 1672, the first theoretical reflection on the
post-Westphalian order.9
There are two classes of modern (formal) constitutional forms that develop
together in the West: the constitutions of modern states and the constitutions
of systems of law beyond the state. The second class today includes not only
what is called international law (the basic laws among modern constitutional
states) but also subsystems of other suprastate bodies of law that have at least
some of the properties of a modern constitutional form: the basic laws of the
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement, the United
Nations (UN) Charter of an international society of states, basic international
human rights law, and the vast array of transnational trade agreements from the,
GATT (1947) to those under the WTO. In addition, these post-decolonization
constitutional forms were built on the basis of much older bodies of
transnational law that were developed along with the European constitutional
states when they were formal empires. These are the bodies of imperial law and
colonial law of the European imperial states, and of the old law of nations, ius
commercium and lex mercatoria that were designed to regulate inter-imperial
competition. Subsystems of these vast systems of law constituted the respective
European empires and their colonies. They were gradually transformed into the
world system of constitutional states and transnational and international laws in
the twentieth century.10
9. Of course, this formality aspect is a feature of much of a modern legal system and not just
the constitution in the narrow sense. As Walker points out, a modern constitution is closely
connected to the legal system it constitutes and thus some properties of constitutional law
will also be properties of some non-constitutional laws. Formality or autonomy is one such
shared property. See Neil Walker, "European Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional
Tradition" in Jane Holder & Colm O'Cinneidi, eds., Current Legal Problems, vol. 59
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 51. I am greatly indebted to Walker's work on
constitutionalism and to Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) for my formulation of the seven features under Part I. For Pufendorf,
see "Editor's Introduction" in James Tully, ed., Pufendorfi On the Duty of Man and Citizen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) xiv.
10. For an excellent introduction to transnational law since World War II, see Peer Zumbansen,
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It is thus misleading historically to picture constitutional states developing
first and then beginning to experiment with transnational and international
constitutional forms in the twentieth century, as legal and political theorists
have done since decolonization. European constitutional states, as state empires,
developed within global systems of imperial and colonial law from the
beginning, and this whole intertwined complex of two classes of constitutional
forms is the historical basis of the very recent, post-decolonization global legal
order. Indeed, like most nineteenth-century theorists and legal historians, both
Marx and Weber argued that the modern European constitutional state form
was dependent for its peculiar historical formation on the legal incorporation
and exploitation of its colonies, just as the legal historians of informal
imperialism today argue that the current constitutional form of the great power
states is equally dependent on the post-colonial legal incorporation and
exploitation of the former colonies by means of the new systems of
international and transnational law.'1 Hence, it is impossible to understand the
relationship between modern constitutional forms and constituent powers
unless the imperial and post-imperial supra-state constitutional forms are seen
as internally related to the state constitutional forms.12
Second, I take "constituent powers" to be the powers of humans
(individually and collectively) to govern themselves. Constituent powers refers
to these powers in abstraction or separation from any specific form they take in
order to be exercised. They take different forms in different constitutional
forms (since the constitutional form is the form that the constituent powers
take): for example, the people, the nation, representative democracy, modern
citizenship, federalism, self-determination, participatory democracy, revolution,
and so on. Even the concept of constituent power as popular sovereignty
"Transnational Law" in Jan M. Smits, ed., Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2006) 738. For its origins in lex mercatoria (merchant law) and ius
commercium of the age of empires, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal
Common Sense, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 208-36. The
systems of transnational law, especially trade law, function as constitutions in the sense that
they subordinate national constitutions, i.e., treat national constitutions as legal regimes
under their jurisdiction (Hart's first-order rules) and open them to free trade. See Steven
Shrybman, The World Trade Organization: A Citizen's Guide (Toronto: James Lorimer, 2001).
11. See Part II below.
12. This internal relation between constitutional state formation and imperialism has always been
commonplace in theories of imperialism. See Mommsen, Theories ofImperialism, supra note 2.
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already recognizes these powers under a concept and thus presupposes a form
and is one step away from the distinctly modern idea of constituent power as a
capacity or potentiality, prior to taking on a concrete form. This modern
concept of unformed constituent power is, of course, the condition of
possibility of the modern idea of popular sovereignty and, more radically, the
multitude: the idea that the people or the multitude could stand back from any
constitutional form of organization of themselves as a specific people and bring
their form of constitutional organization into being in some founding moment
or process of deliberation (the procedures of which would themselves have to be
brought into being by the deliberators, and so on). Perhaps Rousseau was
among the first to explore this paradoxical idea, and Hardt and Negri among
the most recent.13
If we did not have this concept of a constituent power that exists prior to
its actual forms in conjunction with the concept of a disembedded constitutional
form, then we would not have the paradoxical relationship between them that
Loughlin and Walker describe (above), and which is constitutive of the
contingent historical ensemble of nomos and demos we call constitutional
democracy. Indigenous peoples have a different idea of constituent power. For
them the constituent powers of humans (and non-humans) are always already
immanent in the specific forms of transposable habitus they take in the
countless normative relationships of interaction (non-formal customary laws)
that humans and non-humans both bear and transform en passant." And if the
twentieth-century philosophers of practice from Heidegger to Pierre Bourdieu,
13. Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New
York: Penguin, 2004). For a genealogy of the constituent powers of citizens within states-to
which I am deeply indebted-see Quentin Skinner, "States and the freedom of citizens" in
Quentin Skinner & Bo Strath, eds., States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 11. For the incorporation of constituent powers into the
form of rights, see Annabel S. Brett, "The development of the idea of citizens' rights" in
Skinner & Strath 97.
14. For this account of indigenous customary constitutionalism and constituent power internally
related to the law, see the important work of two indigenous legal scholars: John Borrows,
Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002); John Borrows, Justice Within: Indigenous Legal Traditions (Ottawa: Law Commission
of Canada, 2006) [Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions]; and Val Napoleon, "Law as
Governance: Thinking about Indigenous legal orders and law" (Paper presented at the
National Centre for First Nations Governance, Vancouver, July 2006) [unpublished].
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Charles Taylor, and Fuller are correct, the modern systems of formal law
and abstract constituent power, which modern theorists take as their
starting point, are actually grounded in everyday practices of custom and
transposable habitus that go without saying, which indigenous philosophers
take as their starting point."
The constituent powers of the people are constituted into two main
political formations by the two classes of constitutional forms (the state and
suprastate forms of feature one). The first is representative democracy (or
constitutional democracy), with its various forms of modern citizenship,
representation, and institutionalization of various constituent powers
(legislative, judicial, federative, military, administrative, et cetera) within a
constitutional state. The forms of oppositional constituent powers intrinsic to
constitutional representative democracy are extra-parliamentary opposition, the
general strike, direct action, revolution, and so on. The second comprises the
mostly non-representative (or distantly representative) forms of organization of
constituent powers characteristic of suprastate constitutional forms. These
include the governing institutions of the old imperial systems, the European
congresses and conferences of the nineteenth century (which never included
colonial peoples), the League of Nations, the UN, the Bretton Woods
institutions and 'WTO, meetings of the G8, and the (more representative)
institutions of the EU.1 6 And, in democratic opposition, the great decolonization
movements of the twentieth century, internationalist movements, alternative
15. See the classic formulation in Charles Taylor, PhilosophicalArguments (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995) at 165-81 ("To Follow a Rule"). Like Taylor, I see the best treatment
of the internal relationships between a formal system of rules and the transposable
dispositions of the agents who act in/with/against it, which is at the heart of this article, as
that given by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). For an introduction, see James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political
Philosophy" in Cressida J. Heyes, ed., The Grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political
Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) 17. For the application of this view of.
rule-following to the law, see Jutta Brunn~e & Stephen J. Toope, "International Law and
Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law" (2000) 39
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 19; Jeremy Webber, "Legal Pluralism and Human Agency" (2006)
44 Osgoode Hall L. J. 168.
16. The World Trade Organization describes itself as an institution of global governance. For its
ascension to this role, see Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Social Forum, and global
civil society claim to manifest or represent the constituent powers of the people
and struggle to democratize these suprastate constitutional form and constituent
power complexes.
Third, it is not possible to understand the field of interactive relationships
between constitutional forms and constituent powers without seeing a third
actor internally related to these first two features. As Loughlin and Walker
point out, modern constitutionalism did not derive historically from the
exercise of constituent powers of sovereign peoples or multitudes alone. If it
had, we would not have an antagonistic relationship between the forms and the
powers. Rather, as Quentin Skinner has shown, modern constitutions are also
the product of the sovereign in the traditional sense of the ruler: the monarch,
emperor, Crown, aristocracy, ruling class, elite or, more commonly, the
sovereign state, in an agonistic relationship with the people. This is the form of
constitutive power that is traditionally said to constitute the legal and political
order in the West since Roman law. Constituent power in the sense of popular
sovereignty arose in opposition to sovereignty in this Hobbesian sense and
continues to be in a gaming relationship with it (over the form of the constitution
itself, popular freedoms and constitutional limitations). Even when the sovereign
in this sense can plausibly be said to derive its powers from the consent of the
governed, it is still able to separate itself from dependency on them and to
exercise sovereignty over them and the constitution that is supposed to limit its
power, especially in the great game of foreign power with other sovereigns, as
the realist tradition from Bodin to Morgenthau has always argued.17
This doctrine of state sovereignty gives rise to yet another kind of separation:
the relative autonomy of the state (or executive) from both the people and the
constitution. It is integral to modern constitutionalism. A modern constitution,
Kant famously argued, does not arise from the spontaneous interaction of the
pre-civil people. Rather, it requires some kind of master or legislator to impose
law on the crooked timber of the people and to act, without their consent and
independent of law in exceptional circumstances until they are "civilized" by
17. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2: The Age of
Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also Ian Hunter, Rival
Enlightenments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Martin Loughlin, "Ten
Tenets of Sovereignty" in Neil Walker, ed., Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 55.
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centuries of subjection to civil law. As Machiavelli and Chomsky add, these
constitutive powers are supplemented with the powers of "manufacturing the
consent" of the people and making non-constitutional actions appear
constitutional in order to gain legitimacy. Far from disappearing, some
contemporary theorists argue, like Hobbes, that sovereignty in this sense
structures the constitutional form and the form that constituent powers take
within it. That is, the field of "constitutional form and constituent power" is
really a game between the constitutive sovereign and the constituent people
within and over the constitutional form (the contract between them)-a game
that, according to the realists, the sovereign dominates.1 8
As with constitutional forms and constituent powers (features one and
two), there are two corresponding classes of constitutive sovereignty: state
sovereignty in its various forms and the candidates for sovereignty over the
various global constitutional forms listed above. The global sovereigns range
,from the competing imperial powers in the colonial age to the informal
sovereigns today, such as a single superpower (the United States since 1989),
the G8 or G20, a coalition or balance of civilized, advanced or democratic
states, the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, the transnational
corporations empowered by trade agreements under the WTO, an empowered
UN, or some combination of these contenders.
Fourth, I have been writing as if constituent powers (feature two) consist
only of political powers, that is, powers of self-government that are said to be
delegated or alienated to representative institutions and also exercised directly
in public spheres. But this is too narrow. As Locke, Marx, and Weber insisted,
the constituent powers of the people that are institutionalized by a modern
constitutional system of laws consist of three distinct types of powers: political
power or the powers of self-government (feature two); labour or productive
powers; and the powers to protect oneself and others, or military and police
power. Modern constitutions differentially distribute these three types of
constituent powers into three distinct sets of legal institutions of modern
societies: political, economic, and police and military.19
18. See James Tully, "Diverse Enlightenments" (2003) 32 Econ. & Soc'y 485.
19. See James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 9-70 ("An Introduction to Locke's Philosophy")
[Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy]; Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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The second type of constituent power, labour power, is exercised by selling
it for a wage on the market to competing national or multinational corporations
that manage its exercise and extract a profit. These capitalist forms of constituent
labour power and private property in the means of production and contractual
relations are stipulated by the constitutional forms of state and international
legal regimes and enforced by the corresponding sovereigns. This form of
organization of productive power is distinctive to modern constitutionalism.
Humans have been dispossessed of their access to the land and independent
means of production: first, with the enclosures within Europe and then,
with the dispossession of the non-European peoples of their indigenous legal
and political control over their resources and labour during the spread of
western imperialism and'its legal orders, as Marx and Hobson concurred.2"
Just as one can think of political powers being either delegated or alienated
to the representative institutions, so too can one think of economic powers being
either delegated or alienated to the capitalist corporations, as Weber neatly
demonstrated. Productive powers are also conceptualized in the same abstract way
as political powers: that is, as capacities capable of being shaped and exercised
in a multiplicity of forms-within the corporatized division of labour.2'
The third type of constituent power, the powers of self-and-other defence,
is alienated to the police and the military-industrial complex in modern
constitutional formations. Although rebellions were fought in the name of no
standing armies in the seventeenth century, by the early nineteenth century
every modern state had a constitutionally protected permanent military
complex.22 These complexes are standardly connected to the most advanced
research and development institutions, the largest commercial firms, a secure
tax base, a permanent supply of recruits through the levde en masse, the draft,
and, more recently, the state's purchase of private armies on the market, a
20. John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005) [first published in
1902] [Hobson, Imperialism]; Karl Marx, Capital (London: Penguin, 1990) at 873-942. For
a recent history of the legal dispossession of colonized peoples see John C. Weaver, The Great
Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2003).
21. Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, supra note 19 at 242-61 ("Rights in Abilities").
22. Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The history of an international debate (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981); William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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separate class of influential military-political leaders, naval and army bases
throughout the old European empires, and the paramount global military
system of the United States that claims to exercise full spectrum dominance of
the planet today. As Montesquieu foresaw in 1748, this peculiar formation of
protective powers is caught in an ever-escalating arms race with other
constitutional states. And, since decolonization in the twentieth century, it has
developed into an expanding arms-sales industry to dependent and indebted
former colonies and proxy states. As Locke warned in 1675, the resulting power
imbalance between the permanently-armed sovereign state and the legally
disarmed people undermines the rough equality between the people and their
representatives that was the guarantee of a free and constitutionally bound
polity, thereby opening the people to abuse by their own government and to
unlimited military adventures abroad, without an effective counter-balance.
Yet, because the people always desire to be free of oppression, the system is a
recipe for inevitable wars and revolts.23
Just as constituent political powers are organized in different governance
institutions within constitutional states and suprastate organizations (second
feature), so too are economic and military constituent powers. The Bretton
Woods institutions, the G8, and the most powerful transnational corporations
govern economic power through the suprastate systems of trade and finance
law.2" The United States now claims to exercise full spectrum military
dominance over the world's forms of constituent military power to protect.
democracy and free trade, multilaterally and in accord with international law
and the Security Council if possible (juridical dominance), but unilaterally and
without the law if necessary (executive dominance). 25
23. This line of argument was put forward in an anonymous pamphlet believed to be by Locke,
A Letter from a Person of Quality to a Friend in the Country (1675) and is repeated in the Two
Treatises of Government (1690). See Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, supra note 19
at 37-47. For Montesquieu on the arms race, see Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller &
Harold Samuel Stone, eds., Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws [1748] (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 224 (Bk. 13, c.17).
24. The trade agreements under the WTO are seen as global constitutions and charters of rights
of transnational corporations. See Shrybman, World Trade Organization, supra note 10 at 1-18.
25. See U.S., National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States
(2002), online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. The new National Security
Strategy of March 2006 is similar. The National Security Strateg of the United States (2006),
online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2OO6.pdf>.
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I would like to suggest that we cannot understand the dynamics and
paradoxes of the relationship between modern constitutional forms and
constituent powers unless we include in the field of interaction these two types
of constituent powers: economic and defence. The monopolization of
economic constituent power by networked multinationals and international
legal regimes, and the monopolization of powers of self and other defence by
huge networked military complexes are considered beyond question in the
dominant democratic and constitutional theories today, except for a few
notable exceptions. Nevertheless, the social democratic, socialist, and anarchist
movements of the last two hundred years, the non-aligned movements of the
Third and Fourth Worlds, and the massive peace and disarmament movements
of the twentieth century have all been constituent power movements in
opposition to the present constitutional form of economic and military power."
Moreover, the global popular protests from decolonization to the movements
against the current imperial wars in the Middle East and against the neo-liberal
form of free trade imperialism are over precisely the present concentration and
exercise of these two forms of constitutionalized constituent powers and the
inability of the available forms of political power to make any significant
difference whatsoever. This is not surprising, for the low-intensity
representative democratic institutions and modern constitutional formations
have been powerfully shaped and formed by the parallel de-politicization and
concentration of these other two forms of constituent power. Indeed, for many
social scientists today, these two concentrations of economic and military power
. have not only disempowered the people but have usurped the de facto role of
the sovereign within state and global formations." Therefore, an analysis of
constitutional form and constituent power would be out of touch with the
populist global constituent discomfort with the existing order if these two
aspects of constituent power were left unexamined.28
26. See Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: The
New Press, 2007) for the non-aligned (or "acting otherwise") movements and Peter
Ackerman & Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non- Violent Conflict (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) for the abolition of the use of violence.
27. See e.g. Harvey, The New Imperialism, supra note 3.
28. See the similar argument of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum:
A User's Manual (2004), online: Centro de Estudos Sociais <http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/
documentos/fsm.eng.pdf>. For a survey of populist global resistance movements against
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Fifth, all three types of constituent powers of individuals and collectivities
are guided and habituated into their various constituent forms of subjectivity by
the vast repertoires of modern techniques of governmentalit. We know from
Weber, Foucault, Loughlin, and the governmentality school that these techniques
of modern subjectification can neither be reduced to, nor derived from the
sovereign state, the constitution, the rule of law, representative government and
citizenship regimes, or the self-fashioning practices the people apply to
themselves. The historical development of dispersed regimes of governmentality
within modern and advanced liberal constitutional states has been well
researched. The parallel history of regimes of formal colonial governmentality
and the more recent postcolonial governmentality, by various informal means
of global governance and NGOs, has not received as much attention.29
Sixth, the dynamic relationship between constitutional forms and
constituent powers is a function of the complex interactions among the actors
within and against the constitutional formations. To summarize, I outlined the
following: two classes of constitutional forms under which constituent powers
are configured into constitutional actors (the state and transnational classes of
feature one); and constituent political powers, constitutive sovereign
authorities, constituent productive and defensive powers, and regimes of
governmentality. Loughlin and Walker summarize the four main types of
interaction of constituent-power actors with their corresponding constitutional
forms: juridical containment, co-originality and mutual articulation, radical
sovereignty, and irresolution.
In the first type of interaction where the actors all exercise their political,
economic, and protective powers more or less routinely in accord with the two
constitutional formations and their corresponding institutions of constituent
these two forms of power, see Louise Amoore, ed., The Global Resistance Reader (London:
Routledge, 2005).
29. For contemporary, informal imperial governmentality, see Alison J. Ayers, "Demystifying
democratisation: the global constitution of (neo)liberal polities in Africa" (2006) 27 Third
World Quarterly 321; Alison J. Ayers, "Imperial Liberties: Democratisation and Governance
in the New Imperial Order" (2008) Political Studies [forthcoming]. For colontal
governmentalicy, see Peter Pels, "The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History and
the Emergence of Western Governmentaliry" (1997) 26 Ann. Rev. Anthropology 163. For a
review of the limits, compromises, and failures of colonial governmentaliti see Anna Laura
Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) and Part III below.
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powers, the interaction approximates what is called the "juridical containment
thesis." That is, the constitution founds and structures the exercise of
constituent powers, as in modern liberal theories of constitutional democracy.
The second general type of interaction is when the people seek to change the
particular constitutional forms and the corresponding ways their constituent
powers are contained by exercising their popular sovereignty within a modern,
constitutional, and democratic order (and within its traditions of interpretation),
either by constitutional reform or democratic revolution. In this type of case,
the whole interaction is called the "co-originality and mutual articulation
thesis." That is, the constituent powers of democratic self-rule and the
constitutional form of the rule of law are equiprimordial (equally basic) and
worked up together, as in agonistic theories of democratic constitutionalism."
Third, the people subject to a constitutional form see themselves as a multitude
(an as yet unorganized and unrecognized potential agent) behind the whole
constitutional-constituent formation and. they strive to exercise all three constituent
powers together, overthrow the regime, and bring into being a new kind of
constitutional formation, which in turn must be subject to ongoing constituent
transformation (so the multitude remains sovereign over the constitutional
form to which it subjects itself). This type of interaction accords with the
radical sovereignty or self-creation thesis, as in radical democratic theories.31
The fourth type of interaction occurs when diverse individuals and groups
exercise their constituent powers in countless ways within and against the
constitutionalized forms of constituent powers to which they are subject, in the
hopes of modifying or transforming them agonistically en passant, or if they
invent new forms of constituent organizations (such as networks) yet are unable
to transform the hegemony of the prevailing sovereigns and constitutional
forms. This type of interaction is called the irresolution thesis. It is "irresolvable"
because the subaltern citizens are able to modify but not to transform the
unequal relations in which they act.32 It is often seen as a more realistic version
of the co-articulation thesis, given the enormous inequalities among the actors.
The irresolution thesis characterizes fairly accurately the way subalternized
30. For this thesis, see Tully, "The Unfreedom of the Moderns," supra note 5.
31. Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
32. Emilios Christodoulidis, "Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing of Civil Society"
(2004) 9 Eur. L.J. 401.
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states and non-state actors are constrained to interact in the current informal
imperial order, as we saw in the introduction to this article.33 While this list
leaves out a crucially important fifth form of interaction which I highlight in
Part III ("acting otherwise"), it nevertheless encapsulates fairly well the major
forms of interaction characteristic of modern constitutional democracy.
Of course, at the same time, the respective constitutive sovereigns of
modern constitutional states and of global constitutional formations have a
repertoire of constitutional and extra-constitutional ways of re-naming and
responding to the irruptions of popular sovereignty, radical sovereignty, and
agonistic irresolution domestically and internationally, and of bringing them in
line with the containment thesis or a manageable form of the mutual
articulation thesis. Indeed, we can think of the five types of interactive games
between constituent powers and constitutive sovereigns within and over
constitutional, forms as co-extensive with, and the driving force of, the reign of
modern constitutional democracy.
Seventh, as we have seen, this complex of constitutional forms and constituent
powers has a dynamic history. This history is portrayed as a dynamic set of
world historical processes that coordinate the previous six features: respectively,
constitutionalization, representative democratization, centralization of sovereignty,
economic and military modernization, governmentalization, and citizenization
in the state sphere and the transnational and international spheres. These
so-called processes with their purported necessary logics of development bear a
number of descriptive-evaluative names that serve to legitimate them and put
them beyond question: civilization, development, modernization, decolonization,
globalization, democratization, opening to free trade, and so on. They have
their origins in Europe but they sweep up the rest of humanity, which is
portrayed as being at lower stages of historical development and in need of
western imperial aid, and gradually make the world over in accord with
constitutional democracy (in its various iterations over time).3" This telos is
33. But see Part III below for my reformulation of this thesis in tandem with the co-articulation
thesis. For a more optimistic version of the irresolution thesis, see Brunne & Toope, supra
note 15 at 19-74.
34. Of course these six features were not called "constitutional democracy" until recently, after
decolonization and the emergence of a world of formally equal nation states. However, the
present usage of this phrase makes it appear that the contingent histories of the six features
make up aspects of underlying processes that necessarily lead to constitutional democracy as
TULLY, DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM 479
defined in different ways by writers such as Vattel, Smith, Kant, Hegel, Marx,
Mill, Lauterpacht, Westlake, Hartmann, Wheaton, Wilson, Rostow, Fukuyama,
Friedman, Hardt and Negri, and Habermas; yet, as Herder'objected to Kant's
model, it is always posited as a universal and cosmopolitan endpoint for one
and all.3" These legitimating meta-narratives are woven into the horizons of
modern humanities and social and legal sciences, and into the day-to-day
administration of all aspects of constitutional democracies, so deeply that even
critics often accept them as the bounds of reasonable argument. Like the other
six features, these world-process discursive formations have been predicated on
both modernizing constitutional states and their imperializing projects
simultaneously since the early modern period.36 Again, I would like to suggest
that one cannot adequately analyze the dynamics of an ensemble of constitutional
forms and constituent powers without taking into account the discursive
formations employed in its operations.
the end point. And the contingent histories can be arranged so they appear to illustrate the
stages of their development and demonstrate that, at the highest stage, we can see into
constitutional democracy's essential features. As I mentioned in the introduction, this is the
rhetorical function of the phrase in its narrow sense. But it is also important to remember
that we can arrange descriptions of customary legal and political associations so they appear
as natural extensions of constitutional democracy (by showing, for example, that they
perform similar functions). Modern constitutional democracy can, therefore, be seen as a
particular instance of a much broader class of constitutional and democratic association,
rather than as the universal end point. The resulting legal and political pluralism is what I
call "common constitutionalism" in Strange Multiplicity, supra note 5.
35. For critical analyses of these legitimating discourses of imperialism see James Tully, "The
Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives" in Anthony Pagden, ed.,
The Idea of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 331; Martti
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 179ff. (c. 3) & 266ff. (c. 4)
[Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer]; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001); and Bill Ashcroft, Post-Colonial Transformations (London:
Routledge, 2001).
36. See Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France
c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) [Pagden, Lords of all the Worl];
Walter D. Mingolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and
Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For the influence of these
meta-narratives of modernization in decolonization and state-building movements in the
former colonies see Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).
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II. THE IMPERIAL ROLES OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
Part I set out seven features of the modern arrangement of constituent powers
and constitutional forms commonly called constitutional democracy. I suggested
that it cannot be adequately understood by focusing exclusively on its histories
within western states. It also should be set in the broader context of its global
spread by means of western imperialism in its formal (colonial) and informal
(free trade) phases, which was briefly summarized in the introduction. I brought
this broader imperial context into the history of state formation by distinguishing
between two classes of constitutional forms: constitutions within states and
constitutions beyond the state in empire-building and international law (feature
one). Then, I indicated how the following five features of modern constitutional
democracy also developed simultaneously within states and beyond states, in the
imperial realm. The seventh feature showed how these features are integrated in
the grand discursive formations (or meta-narratives) of constitutional democratic
modernization in theory and practice. I will now turn to a very brief historical
synopsis of how these features of modern constitutional democracy have been
spread by means of western imperialism. In Part III, I indicate diverse forms of
responses to their imposition and the types of interaction they generate.
Eighth, since the early modern period, European states have asserted a crucial
eighth feature of modern constitutional democracy. This is the right of European
states and their companies to trade freely in non-European societies and the duty to
civilize non-European peoples, together with the duty of hospitality of non-European
peoples to open themselves to trade and civilization. If indigenous peoples resist
and defend their own constitutional forms and constituent powers and civilizations,
and thus violate the international duty of hospitality, the imperial powers have the
right and duty to impose coercively the conditions of trade, hospitality and
civilization: namely, the appropriate features of modern constitutional forms and
constituent powers. The right and two duties-in their many formulations from
Francisco de Vitoria through Locke and Kant to the GATT/WTO and the
restructuring policies of the World Bank, and the norm of democratization under
international law-serve to legitimate the coercive imposition and protection of
the legal and political conditions of western imperialization on the non-West. I
will call the right and two duties the "imperial right."37
37. For an introduction to the complex history of the imperial right see Anghie, Imperialism,
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The imperial right has been exercised in three major ways over the last
half millennium: colonization, indirect rule (including protectorates), and
informal rule.3 8 The first is the implantation of European settler colonies in
the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand. In these cases of replication
imperialism the rudimentary colonial structures of modern constitutional
forms and constituent powers were imposed over the legal and political
systems of the Indigenous peoples, dispossessing them of their territories
and usurping their governments, by force or dishonoured treaties.
Approximately 80 per cent of the indigenous population, which was larger
than Europe's in 1492, was exterminated by 1900."9 The remaining
indigenous peoples were subjected to forced assimilation or removed to tiny
reserves with limited powers of local self-government, and ruled
despotically by ministries of indigenous affairs. When the colonies freed
themselves from the British, Spanish, and Portuguese empires, they retained the
legal structures of the colonial period and continued to exert and extend
imperial sovereignty over indigenous peoples and their territories throughout
the four continents.
supra note 3; Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 5; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra
note 35; and Pagden, Lords of all the World, ibid. For a critical analysis of the norm of
democratization under international law today see Susan Marks, The Riddle of all
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000). A well-known and illustrative example of the duty of hospitality of
non-Europeans to open themselves to European trade or face punishment under international
law prior to nineteenth-century international law is Kant's cosmopolitan right and duty of
hospitality, the third definitive article of Perpetual Peace. There is a long history of this
cosmopolitan right and correlative duty of openness, referred to as ius commercium, in the
earlier law of nature and drawn upon by Kant. For the right of western powers to impose a
structure of law over non-western societies that do not have a formal system of law (feature
one), see Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" in H.S. Reiss, ed.,
Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 93 at 99, the note
to the first paragraph. See also the commentary in Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 3 at 295-97.
38. For an analysis of these forms of imperialism, see Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986) at 30-50 [Doyle, Empires]. For a synopsis of the history of western
imperialism, see David Abernethy, Global Dominance: European Empire 1415-1980 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
39. See Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta
to Darjur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
40. Paul Havemann, ed., Indigenous Peoples'Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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The second method of constitutional imperialization is indirect colonial
rule. The imperial powers establish a small colonial administration or trading
company to rule over a much larger indigenous population indirectly, by
establishing a formal infrastructure of imperial law and lex mercatoria while also
preserving and modifying the existing indigenous customary constitutions and
constituent powers so that resources and labour are privatized and opened to
trade, labour discipline, and investments and contract law dominated by the
European trading companies. Once this legal system is in place, resistance is
illegal under their own laws. As Hobson explained in Imperialism in 1902, the
various means include recognizing local rulers as quasi-sovereigns and making
unequal treaties with them, civilizing or westernizing local elites and making
them dependent on imperial economic and military power and bribes, dividing
and conquering opposition, training the indigenous armies to protect the
imperial system of property and trade law and to fight proxy wars for them,
inciting resistance so the trading companies can claim compensation for damages
and lost profits (as in Iraq after 2003), and so on. This is the major way the
imperial right was exercised in India, Ceylon, and Africa prior to its violent
recolonization after 1885, and in the Middle East in the twentieth century.1
The third way-informal or free trade imperialism-can be seen as one
step beyond indirect rule. The imperial power permits the self-rule and eventual
self-determination of indigenous peoples within a protectorate or sphere of
influence while exercising informal paramountcy (hegemony) to induce them
to open their resources, labour, and markets to free trade by establishing the
appropriate legal and political forms, thereby combining empire and liberty, the
oldest rallying cry of British and US imperialism. "2 The informal ways and
means include the recognition of quasi-sovereignty and unequal treaties;
economic, military, and aid dependency; bribes; sanctions; the "civilization of
the natives" by voluntary and religious organizations and by western legal,
political, economic, and military experts; and threats of military intervention
and actual military intervention if all else fails. These diverse means of open
41. Hobson, Imperialism, supra note 20. For the Middle East see Robert Fisk, The Great War for
Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East (New York: Harper/Collins, 2006) [Fisk, The
Great War] and Doyle, Empires, supra note 38 for a comprehensive survey.
42. See David Armitage, "Empire and Liberty: A Republican Dilemma" in Martin van Gelderen
& Quentin Skinner, eds., Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, vol. 2: The Values of
Republicanism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 29.
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door or intervention imperialism, as it is also called, replace and often supersede
historically earlier formal colonization or indirect rule (which laid the
groundwork). The ultimate guarantee is the establishment of small yet
overwhelming naval and military bases (originally coaling stations) established
throughout the imperialized world, such as Guantanamo Bay (1901) that can
threaten or actually intervene on a moment's notice if subaltern peoples
threaten to take control of their own resources or foreign companies. The
British Empire and the United States illustrated the superiority of informal
imperialism over the expensive old colonial system during the nineteenth
century in their competitive free-trade paramountcy over the independent
former colonies of Latin America (with frequent interventions). As I mentioned
in the introduction, it has grown to become the dominant form of imperialism
since decolonization, and the United States now has over 725 military bases
strategically located around the world. 3
The different formulations of the imperial right were brought together in
an authoritative form in the European and US construction of modern
international law in the nineteenth century. As Gerrit Gong, Martti
Koskenniemi, Edward Keene, and Antony Anghie have. shown in their
remarkable studies of the creation of modern international law, the centrepiece
of this project is the standard of civilization. Civilization refers to both a set of
world historical processes and an end point: namely, the seven features of
constitutional democracy of the previous section. (After decolonization and the
criticism of the imperial uses of civilization by the new third-world states at the
UN, the term civilization was replaced by modernization and democratization,
although civilization has come back in use.)"
The modern constitutional state with its seven features was defined as the
uniquely "civilized" and universal legal and political order. Only European
states (and the United States in 1895) met the standard and were thus recognized
43. For the rise of US-led informal imperialism see Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire:
Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002);
Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New
York: Owl Books, 2004).
44. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984); Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra note 35; and
Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 3.
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as sovereign under international law. The complex and overlapping legal and
political associations of the non-western peoples who had been colonized over
the previous four hundred years were defined in contrast as customary and
uncivilized. Hence they were not recognized under international law but were
subject to the imperial law of the respective sovereign powers. In Kant's influential
formulation, the very fact that the so-called uncivilized peoples lacked a modern
constitutional form was asserted to be a threat to civilized states. This threat
gave them the right to impose western law, by treaty or by removing them from
their traditional territories if possible, or, if they failed to submit, to employ
coercion. 5 Since openness to free trade, acceptance of corresponding domestic
and international legal orders, and a western territorial state form were defining
aspects of a civilized society, if an indigenous society resisted and tried to retain
customary jurisdiction and sovereignty over its own constitutional association,
it was considered uncivilized and a civilized legal order was imposed in one of
the three ways described above." The few non-western civilizations that were
too strong to be bullied in this way were brought into or alongside the club of
great powers and restructured accordingly (as with China and Japan).
The right of the self-proclaimed civilized imperial powers to extend
colonial and international modern constitutional regimes around the world
correlated with a "sacred duty to civilize" the indigenous peoples under their
rule. Non-western civilizations, many of which are older and more complex
than the aggressive western states, were scientifically classified at various stages
of historical backwardness or underdevelopment relative to the "civilized"
imperial states, and subjected to calibrated techniques of civilization and
modernization. The civilizing duty involved, first and foremost, imposing the
civilizing western laws over indigenous legal order; dispossessing, marginalizing,
or transforming their customary forms of cooperative ownership, work, and
governance; and introducing capitalist corporations, foreign investment, labour
discipline, modern contractual relationships, and a territorially-based colonial
45. Kant, Perpetual Peace, supra note 37 at 98; Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 3 at 295-97.
46. Gong, supra note 44 at 14-15, summarizes the features of the "standard of civilization." The
openness to trade and subordination to western free trade laws is the first feature. This
fundamental feature is repeated in the latest trade agreements under the WTO, in the Most
Favoured Nation Rule, which derives from the GATT (1947): GeneralAgreement on Tariff
and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Art. 1 ("General Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment").
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political order. The second dimension of the duty to govern the uncivilized was
to apply colonial govern mentaliti in detail to shape and form their forms of
subjectivity so they would assume civilized forms of self-government in stages
and acquire the competitive individualism of a modern, foreign-controlled
capitalist economy in a global system led by the developed states."
International law was powerless to enforce this civilizing duty on the
imperial states in the nineteenth century. Although it was clearly in the
long-term interest of a stable, juridical imperial system, the competing imperial
states reverted to the short-term executive strategy of war, pillage, slavery,
hyper-exploitation, genocide, and destruction in Africa, and the tropics more
generally, after the Berlin Conference of 1885 (similar to the atrocities in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon 118 years later). 8 This unbridled imperial
competition culminated in World War I, the "great war for civilization." 9 In
1919 the great powers realized that they could not continue the mutually
destructive "great game" of competing militarily over the domination and
exploitation of the non-western world. They tried to set up a League of Nations
and an international legal order that would, first, force the great powers into a
more cooperative and law-based form of imperialism, and second, establish a
shared, international project of civilizing the natives and guiding them to
self-rule. The first project, which Hobson and Kautsky feared as the coming
cooperative hyper-imperialism, was not achieved until after World War II, the
establishment of the UN, decolonization, and the Cold War triumph of the
western powers over the socialist states. The second project took the form of the
Mandate System under the League of Nations. The colonized peoples were
classified into three main uncivilized types and techniques of modernization
were applied (irregularly) by the respective mandatory imperial states as they
increased resource exploitation, especially in the oil-rich Middle East. These
policies of governmentality to prepare colonial peoples for western-style
self-government continued during the Trustee System of the UN. After formal
47. In addition to the excellent treatment of the sacred duty of civilization by Gong, Keene,
Koskenniemi, and Anghie, see the classic critique of it in Marx, Capital, supra note 20 at
931-42, and Hobson, Imperialism, supra note 20 at 113-327.
48. See Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra note 35 at 98-166 for the "new imperialism" of the
1890s. And see Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afhanistan, Iraq, Palestine (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005) for the "new imperialism" of the 2000s.
49. John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History (London: Routledge, 2005).
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independence, the duty to civilize took the form of the trade agreements of the
WTO, the imposition of neo-liberal structural adjustment and privatization
programmes of the WB and IMF, the norm of democratization under
international law, and the mobilization of thousands of aid agencies, NGOs
and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) creating civil societies and neo-liberal
modes of subjectivity throughout the 120 former colonies."0
The great decolonization movements of the mid-century temporarily
disrupted these two projects. The former colonies tried to free themselves from
both formal and informal imperialism, to form a Third World not aligned with
western or Soviet imperialism, and to continue to develop their own distinctive
constitutional forms, constituent powers, and civilizations (as both Fanon and
Gandhi hoped). However, the former colonies were constrained by the informal
means available to the great powers to exercise their constituent powers of
self-determination in accord with modern constitutional forms and constituent
powers, open themselves to free trade dominated by the great powers, and submit
to international legal regimes that denied them permanent sovereignty over their
own resources, or otherwise face military intervention and regime change. This
modernization and dependency project was often carried through by the third-
world westernized elites, corrupted by massive economic and military dependency,
against the resistance of the majority of their own people, who dreamed of creating
their own democracies, rather than the "low intensity" nationalist democracies
they were forced to accept.5 The resulting resource rich petro-tyrannies, sweatshop
50. See Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 3 at 115-272; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra note
35 at 465-509; and Shrybman, supra note 10. For the mandate system see Michael D.
Callahan, Mandates and Empires: The League ofNations and Africa 1914-1931 (Sussex:
Academic Press, 1999); Michael D. Callahan, A Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and
Africa 1919-1946 (Sussex: Academic Press, 2004). For neo-liberal forms of governmentality
of many NGOs and CSOs, see the two articles by Ayers, supra note 29.
51. See Prasenjit Duara, ed., Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (London:
Routledge, 2004). This history explains why "indigenous peoples" and "indigenous laws" are
used in broad and narrow senses. In the broad sense, indigenous peoples refers to all non-
European peoples who have been subject to western imperialism. As western-style formal
legal systems were imposed and decolonization carried out, the peoples who acquired
statehood (and were thus considered "civilized") ceased to be called indigenous. "Indigenous
peoples" came to be used narrowly to refer to those peoples who are subject to the
continuing internal colonization of the original settler states and the new post-decolonization
states: that is, the "Fourth World" of 250 million people today.
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dictatorships, and strategically important regional dependencies remain unstable
"failed states" as a direct result of their continuing subjection to informal
imperial manipulation: the dependent elites are constrained by their dependency
to suppress the popular aspirations of their people to control their own resources
and work conditions; the people are driven to violence in self-defence; this is
called failure and terrorism; and-as Locke predicted 52-intervention follows.5 3
This synopsis brings us up to the global network of informal imperialism I set
out in the introduction, now with the roles of the institutions of constitutional
democracy added to it. The result is that the low intensity constitutional
democratization of the former colonies, and the quasi-constitutional transnational
and international legal regimes that override them if necessary, now provide the
legal and political basis of a new phase of western imperialism. With the
international power of the great powers concentrated in the Security Council,
the institutions of global governance, NATO, and US full-spectrum dominance,
these "unequal sovereigns" are able to exercise "legalized hegemony" over the
nominally sovereign yet substantively subalternized former colonies."4 The
resulting inequalities, extreme poverty, dispossession, irresponsible foreign
control, and destructiveness are greater under post-colonial imperialism than
under colonialism. 5 Yet the only official debate in the West is whether global
rule will be primarily executive-based and unilateral (the current policy of the
United States and United Kingdom) or primarily law-based and multilateral
(the European alternative)."5 The shared historical foundation of these two
historically intertwined strategies (warfare and lawfare) in the imperialism of
constitutional democracy we have surveyed goes without saying."7
52. Supra note 19.
53. Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora & Richard Wilson, eds., Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power
in the New World Order (London: Pluto, 1993); Alexander Wendt & Michael Barnett,
"Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization" (1993) 19 Rev. Int'l Stud.
321. For more recent surveys see Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the
Assault on Democracy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Gregory, supra note 48; James
F. Petras & Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century
(London: Zed Books, 2004); and Fisk, The Great War, supra note 41.
54. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, supra note 4.
55. Jeremy Seabrook, The No-Nonsense Guide to World Poverty (London: Verso, 2003).
56. Peter Swan, "American Empire or Empires? Alternative Juridifications of the New World
Order" in Amy Bartholomew, ed., Empire's Law (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
57.' It is worth noting that these two strategies or wings within the shared meta-narratives and
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III. BEYOND IMPERIALISM: DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN PRACTICE
In summary, constitutional democracy, consisting of the eight features of the
last two sections, plays three main roles in western imperialism: (1) low intensity
constitutional democratization has been imposed on non-western peoples
without their consent or democratic participation; (2) these colonies and
post-colonial replicas are subject and subordinate to a cluster of regimes of
transnational and international laws over which they have no or little say; and
(3) these regimes in turn are governed by the most powerful constitutive
sovereign states through global institutions and military networks in which the
governed have no or little say, even though they are the vast majority of the
world's population. All three roles are imperial and abhorrent in their inequalities
and injustices, yet each is composed of features of constitutional democracy in
its dominant narrow sense.
How can these three deeply entrenched roles of constitutional democracy
be de-imperialized? A democratic answer is to work to bring the basic
constitutional and constituent structures that are employed in these three roles
under the shared participatory authority of those who are subject to them. This
is the basic idea of democratic freedom and democratic constitutionalism: the
laws must always be open to the criticism, negotiation, and modification of
those who are the subjects of them. As we sav in feature two of Part I, this
participatory and reflexive freedom of negotiating the norms to which we are
subject en passant is at the heart of non-modern, customary constitutional
forms and immanent constituent powers. The formalization and disembedding
of modern constitutionalism and constituent powers displaced this freedom to
representative institutions. 8 The imposition of proto-constitutional democracy
under imperialism'has attenuated this representative freedom even further in
the low intensity democratization of colonial and post-colonial regimes. And,
finally, the transnational and international legal regimes reduce the
participatory freedom of the governed to the vanishing point. Yet, as we also
institutions of constitutional democracy have been a feature of western imperialism for over a
century. The debate over the new imperialism today is very similar to the debate over the
new imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century.
58. For this history, see James Tully, "Democracy and Globalization" in Ronald Beiner & Wayne
Norman, eds., Canadian Political Philosophy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 36.
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saw, even formal systems of law are grounded in everyday customary practices
underlying the formal institutions of law-making, law-following, law-enforcing,
law-interpreting, and law-adjudicating in which the laws are negotiated within
limits in the course of interaction. So the project of democratic
constitutionalism is not primarily one of bringing even more cumbersome
representative institutions to bear from the outside. It is to exploit and expand
the existing yet severely limited field of possibilities of direct participatory
freedom (the exercise of constituent powers) within and against the
constitutional forms to which the governed are now subject, directly or
indirectly, at the very sites where these unjustly constrain their ability to
exercise shared authority over the conditions of their activities. This is not the
freedom either to protest against imperialism or to confront it directly in a
revolution aimed at overthrowing it, as important as these freedoms are. The
co-optation of decolonization revolutions and the sidelining of protests by
informal imperial means have caused anti-imperialists to turn to these concrete
practices of democratic constitutionalism. These practices are of two main
types: (1) organizing non-imperially to contest, negotiate, modify, and perhaps
transform the imperial dimensions of modern constitutional democracy from
within, and (2) turning to alternative legal and political associations ("acting
otherwise" or legal and political pluralism). The diverse global trends of legal
and political interactionism and pluralism can be seen as either a more realistic
reformulation of the co-articulation thesis under real world conditions of
hegemon-subaltern relationships or an optimistic reformulation of the situated
freedom depicted in the irresolution thesis (of feature six of Part 1)."
As we know from the history of imperialism, such practical attempts to
democratize constitutional democracy will be met with official opposition and
force.6' However, this response further exposes the false and anti-democratic
59. This turn to concrete constituent practices of freedom within, and against, imperial relations
of power was introduced after decolonization by Frantz Fanon, Partha Chaterjee, Edward
Said, and Michel Foucault. For a fuller theoretical account, see Michael Simpson, The
Creative Insurgence of Subjugated Practices: Non-Capitalist Practices and the Interstices of
Capitalist Modernity (MA Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2006); Tully, "On Law,
Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2.
60. See e.g. Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Global Outlook, 2003); Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's quest
forglobal dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003).
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premise of imperial constitutional democracy. In my discussion of the imperial
right in Part II we saw that the premise has always been that the non-western
"other" is uncivil and untrustworthy because it is not already subject to a
structure of civil law and the civilizing effects of subjection. Therefore, before
democratic dialogue and negotiation over legal and political arrangements can
begin a structure of western law has to be imposed. Constitutionalism precedes
democracy. This is the juridical containment thesis (of feature six). But this
premise is false and the cause of endless imperial wars.
Non-western peoples have always been subject to their own nomoi and
demoi and have been civilized by them in their different ways. There is thus no
reason why democratic dialogue and negotiation cannot precede and ground
the negotiation of shared constitutionalism. The willingness to enter into
dialogue with others in this disarmed, open, and trusting way generates trust, as
Gandhi and Hans-Georg Gadamer have shown in practice and theory, whereas
the coercive imposition of the law of one over the other, backed up by the
ever-present threat of more military intervention, destroys trust and generates
ressentiment, as the young Nietzsche saw."1 It is rather the imperial powers that
do not respect the others' laws and ways but misrecognize and delegitimate
them-as mere customs, uncivilized, savage, the lawless state of nature, terra
nullius, the Wild West, terrorist regimes, or rogue states-and then intervene
and subvert them. This has been the structure of argument and practice of the
imperial right since the sixteenth century.62
What can be done? Despite the destructiveness of imperialism, non-western
customary legal and political normative orders have not been completely destroyed
or superseded, as the western meta-narratives confidently continue to predict.
Western expansion has not been as total as its defenders and critics assume. In
61. For Gandhi and his immense influence on twentieth-century decolonization, disarmament,
and non-violent movements, see Thomas Weber, Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor
(Cambridge' Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Weber, Gandhi]; Jonathan Schell, The
Unconquerable World: Power, Non-violence, and the Will of the People (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2003); and Ackerman & DuVall, A Force more Powerful, supra note 26.
For Gadamer's argument that this is the only genuine (non-imperial) form of dialogue, see
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth andMethod, trans. by J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall (New
York: Crossroad, 1999) 341. For Nietzsche, see Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Means to Real
Peace" in Human all too Human, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) 380.
62. Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 3 at 13-31.
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Part II it was noted that imperial rule is always parasitic on the persistence of
non-western customary legal and political practices for its daily operation because
it has to rely on the indirect and informal collaboration of the subaltern peoples,
that is, the majority of the world's population. The practical room to maneuver
within indirect and informal power relations has enabled the diverse peoples of
the world to "act otherwise" to some limited extent: that is, to live creatively in
accord with their own ever-changing customary constitutional forms and
constituent powers within the interstices of imperial constitutional. formations
to vastly varying degrees.63 Even the most relentlessly imperialized people-the
Indigenous peoples of the Americas-have preserved their normative legal and
political and civilizational practices and are now enacting a renaissance or
resurgence of them within and against continuing internal colonization."
Hence, as legal pluralists show, there are subjugated and overlooked "alternative
worlds" or "alternative modernities" of law and governance that exist in the
day-to-day practices of millions of people, despite the overarching hegemony
and seeming inescapability of the particular western form of constitutional
democracy.6" As Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues, existing legal and political
pluralism is neither to be rejected as uncivilized nor accepted uncritically, but
brought into critical and comparative dialogues with western traditions of
organizing democratic authority non-imperially, both locally and globally."
63. The extreme case is where a colonized people have been so totally assimilated that they take
on the customary practices, habitus, and forms of subjectivity that undergird formal
constitutional democracy in the western world. This is much less common than is supposed
by modernization theories, and the space for living alternative civilizations within it, which
often go unnoticed by western observers, is much greater than is supposed. Even within the
West, culturally diverse peoples act in culturally different ways to a very large extent within
shared legal and political orders, and constantly negotiate the boundaries. See Antje Wiener,
The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) on diversity of rule-negotiating in the EU.
See also James Tully, "Introduction" in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, eds.,
MultinationalDemocracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1.
64. See Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions, supra note 14; Napoleon, "Law as Governance," supra
note 14 for references to the resurgence of legal and political pluralism among indigenous peoples.
65. Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Santos, Towarda New Legal Common
Sense, supra note 10 at 85-154.
66. Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C&sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, eds., Law and Globalization
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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And these experiments are the growing bases of non-imperial forms of global
networking that seek to provide a "living democracy" alternative to the current
constitutional forms of the WB, IMF, and WTO.67 Many see the World Social
Forum as a meeting place for practitioners of non-imperial and anti-imperial
globalization from below.68
Analogous spaces of democratic freedom exist in western countries. Millions
of westerners refuse to support the imperial dimensions of constitutional
democracy and strive to create non-imperial legal and political ways of interacting
with partners in the rest of the world, gradually de-imperializing constitutional
democracy from within.69 Following the examples of Gandhi, Vandana Shiva,
Johan Galtung, Fritz Schumacher, Arne Naess, Kofi Annan, Thich Nhat Hanh,
and countless other mentors, they are building networks of globalization in which
the constitutional form of the network is based on the ongoing democratic and
non-violent exercise of the constituent powers of the partners who subject themselves
to it.7" These experiments in democratic constitutionalism include democratic
cooperatives rather than private corporations; fair trade rather than free trade;
local democracy and non-violent dispute resolution rather than the recourse to
arms; deep ecology and mutual aid rather than aid tied to privatization, economic
competition, and military bases; and dialogues among the civilizations involved.71
67. Jerry Mander & Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, eds., Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples'Resistance to
Economic Globalization (San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, 2005).
68. See e.g. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Rise of a Global Left: The World Social Forum and
Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2006).
69. James Tully, "A New Kind of Europe?: Democratic integration in the European Union"
(2007) 10 Crit. Rev. Int'l Soc. Pol. Phil. 71.
70. For Gandhi's influence on these scholars and activists, see Weber, Gandhi, supra note 61.
Thich Nhat Hanh, Keeping the Peace: Mindfulness and Public Service (Berkeley: Parallax
Press, 2005) describes the non-violent dialogical way to peace in contrast to the imperial way
of war and force: "When the Israelis and Palestinians have listened to each other and
communicated in Plum Village [a non-violent retreat in France], they return to the Middle
East and establish communities of practice, and invite other people to join. We are able to
make change on a small scale. But it has proven to be effective. If our governments apply the
techniques, creating an atmosphere of peace, helping people to calm down, helping them to
sit down and listen to each other, that is a much better way to remove terrorism and war
than the way of war and force. In 2004, the United States spent about four billion dollars a
month in Iraq. Organizing a retreat costs much less" (at 84).
71. See e.g. John Cavanagh, ed., Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A report of the
international forum on globalization (San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler, 2002).
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Despite the horrors of present-day imperialism, and perhaps partly because of
them, there are arguably more activities of creating non-imperial customary
normative orders and of modifying the more formal imperial normative orders
from the inside than at any other time in the long history of non-imperial and
anti-imperial movements.
72
The growing movement for democratic constitutionalism and global
justice in western legal and political research centres can play an important
partnership role in the growth of democratic constitutionalism in practice. The
diverse practical examples of democratizing representative democracy and of
legal and political pluralism strive to manifest, in concrete forms, the pluralistic
and egalitarian ideal of genuinely democratic constitutionalization that critical
scholars-such as Edward Said, Iris Marion Young, Thomas Pogge, and
Boaventura de Sousa Santos-are trying to articulate.73 Such a relationship of
reciprocal elucidation between de-imperializing practices of democratic
constitutionalism and critical theoretical and empirical research may help in
time to make the irresolution thesis less pessimistic and the co-articulation
thesis more plausible than they are at the moment.7"
72. This is the argument of Paul Hawken, Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World
Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming (New York: Viking, 2007).
73. See e.g. Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for
Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
74. I would like to thank Andre Boiselle, Jutta Brun6e, Stephen Toope, Neil Walker, and
Jeremy Webber for helping me to see the de-imperializing role of practices of democratic
constitutionalism. In memory of Iris Marion Young, whose spectacular work and personality
inspired us and kept our spirits aloft in these dark times. It is up to us to carry on under the
gentle sway of her example.

